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ABSTJUCT 
A systcmatic approach to closure planning is being implcmcntcd at the Ilanford Site’s Ccntral 
Platcau to hclp achicve the goal of cIosure by the year 2035. The ovcrall objective of Central 
Platcau rcmcdiation is to protect human hcalth and the cnvironmcnt from the significant quantity 
of contaminatcd material that rcsultcd from dccades of plutonium production in support of our 
nation’s defcnse. This goal will be achieved either by removing contaminants or placing the 
rcsidual contaminatcd matcrials in a secure configuration that minimizes further migration to the 
groundwater and reduces the potcntial for inadvertent intrusion into contaminatcd sites. 
The approach to Ccntral Pfatcau clcanup used Uuce kcy concepts - closure zones, closure 
clemcnts, and closure process stcps- to crcate an organizcd picture of actions rcquircd to 
complcte rcmcdiation. Thcse actions wcre mcrgcd with logic tics, constraints, and rcquircd 
rcsourccs to produce an integrated time-phascd schedule and cost profile for Ccntral Platcau 
closure. Programmatic risks associatcd with implementation of Ccntral Plateau closure wcre 
idcntificd and analyzcd Actions to mitigate the most significant risks are undcnvay while high 
priority rcmcdiation projccts continue to make progress. 
INTRODUCrION 
The Hanford Site, managcd by the U.S. Dcpartmcnt of Encrgy (DOE), is a 1518 square- 
kilometcr (586 square-mile) site locatcd in southeastern Washington State. The site was 
cstablishcd in 1943 to support the weapons production complex and produccd about GO pcrccnt 
of the Unitcd Statcs’ plutonium inventory. The Central Platcau, occupying about 195 square- 
kilometers (75 square rnilcs) at the heart of the site, scrvcd as the ccnter for plutonium 
scparations and finishing from the mid-1940s through the late 1980s. 
The production mission rcsultcd in the construction of hundreds of processing and support 
facilitics along with the gcncration of large volumcs of liquid and solid wastes. Since the 
conclusion of the production mission in 1989, the Hanford Site has focuscd on an cnvironmcnta1 
restoration mission. Nearly4,OOO individual significant items rcmain to be cIeancd up within the 
Central Platcau. The large number of itcms and the complex nature of the clcanup prcsent a 
daunting challenge. Large hcavily contaminatcd proccssing and support facilitics rcmain, along 
with liquid and solid waste handling, storage, and disposal facilitics that present a potentid h a t  
to human hcalth and the environment. A comprehensive planning effort was rcccntly undertaken 
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by DOE and the prime contractor, Fluor Hanford (Fluor), focusing on closure of the Central 
Plateau. 
PLAN FOR CENTRAL PLATEAU CLOSURE 
In 2004, DOE’S Richland Operations Office requested that Fluor develop an approach for 
defining the full scope of work required and quantifying the resources necessary to complete 
Central Plateau closure. The Plan for Centrul Plateau Closure (Plan) [ 11 documented this 
approach and organized Central Plateau cleanup using three key concepts - geographic closure 
zones, closure elements, and closure process steps. These concepts enabled a systematic 
approach to closure planning not previously used for the Central Plateau. 
Closure Zones 
The regional closure concept was first introduced in the Performance Management Plan for 
Accelerated Cleanup of the Hanford Site [2]. A follow-on planning activity, Optimization 
Strategy for Central Pluteau Closure [3], defined closure zones in consultation with DOE Field 
offices, regulatory agencies, and contractors. Central Plateau planning encompasses 22 closure 
zones, organized around significant processing or waste management facilities. Figure 1 shows 
the relative location and size of the Central Plateau and closure zones. 
Fig. 1. Hanford’s Central Plateau contains 22 closure zones. 
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Closure Elements 
Within the closure zones, there are multiple processing and support facilities, tank systems, 
liquid and solid waste handling, storage, and disposal facilities, utility systems, and wells. Five 
closure clcmcnts were formulatcd to sort items rcquiring cleanup into logical groupings to enable 
consistcnt closure approaches, schedules, and cost estimation. 
Canyons - Five large processing facilities wcre constructed to separate plutonium and uranium 
from spent fuel imdiatcd in the nine Hanford Site production reactors. Three identical canyo~~s, 
B Plant, T Plant, and U Plant, wcre built in the 1940% whiIe the Reduction-Oxidation (REDOX) 
Canyon and the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant were constructed in the 1950s. 
The canyon buildings range from approximately 180 to more than 300 mctcrs long (GOO - 1000 
feet) and from about 22 mcters to more than 30 meters high (75 - 100 feet.) Approximately one- 
third of each structure is bclow grade level for shielding purposes. Thick reinforced concrete 
walls, floors, and shielding blocks cnclose process vcssels, piping, and instrumentation. B Plant, 
U Plant, REDOX and PUREX are currcntly in the survcillancc and maintcnance (S&M) mode. 
Central Plateau closure planning includes all activities ncccssary to remcdiatc these canyon 
facilities and the legacy cquipmcnt and materials inside. T Plant is the only canyon still active. 
It is currcntly uscd for waste treatment and repackaging operations. Deactivation activities will 
be conductcd to rcmove excess materials and cquipmcnt at the conclusion of T Plant's operating 
mission. Ccntnl Plateau closure planning includes rcmediation of the T Plant canyon structure 
following deactivation. A Record of Dccision for final disposition of the U Plant Canyon was 
issucd in October 2005. [4] Pending work planning and funding availability, legacy materials 
and equipment will be placcd inside the below-grade process cells. Void space will be fillcd to 
stabilize the material and prevent subsidence followcd by dcmolition of the upper structure. 
Demolition dcbris will be left in place and an cnginccrcd surface b a n k  will be placcd over the 
dcmolishcd structure and adjacent area. 
m- One hundred forty nine single-shell tanks and 28 double-shell tanks have bccn uscd for 
storage of predominantly high activity liquid waste generated during reprocessing operations. 
Tank capacity ranges from nominally 200 cubic meters to 3800 cubic meters (55,000 to 
1,000,000 gal1ons.) All 177 tanks are underground. Tank waste is currcntly being retrieved 
from single-shell tanks and transfcrrcd to the more robust doubleshell tanks. Central Plateau 
closure planning includes closure ictivitics for the emptied tanks and ancillarj' systems as well as 
integration with other cleanup activities. DOE'S Ofice of River Protection is rcsponsibk for 
rctrieval of waste from both single-shell and doubleshell tanks and stabilization in a waste form 
suitable for permanent disposal. 
Waste Sites - More than 800 waste sites remain on the Central Plateau requiring clcanup. Thc 
waste site inventory includes liquid and solid waste handling, storage and disposal sites, as well 
as unplanned release sites. An cstimatcd 1.7 billion cubic mctcrs (450 billion gallons) of liquid 
cMucnt wcre discharged into the soil using cribs, ponds, ditches, drains, tile fields, and injection 
wells. Some liquid discharge sites contain radionuclidc and chemical contamination from the 
earth's surface to the groundwater approximately 75-90 meters (250-300 feet) below. Olhcr 
liquid waste discharge sites contain only shallow contamination, while still others have 
contaminants at diffcrent levels within the vadose zone. Liquid waste discharge sites range from 
large ponds covering 20 hectares (50 acres) to small unplanned releases covering a few square 
mcters. Solid waste sites range from large radioactive, mixed, or industrial waste burial grounds 
to small dcbris pilcs left behind after construction activities. The waste site closure clement 
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includcs more than 100 unplanned release sitcs rcsulting from spills or leaks of radioactive 
matcrials and/or hazardous substances. Ccntnl Plateau closure planning cncompasses 
rcmcdiation of all these waste sitcs, as well as integration with groundwatcr rcmcdiation 
activities, tank closure planning and canyonlstructure rcmcdiation. A final dccision on 
disposition of 33 waste sites within the U Plant Zone is nearing completion. This will be the first 
Rccord of Dccision for disposition of soil waste sitcs on the Central Platcau. 
Structurcs - Ncarly 1000 structures have been constructcd on the Central Platcau. These include 
complex processing facilities, such as the Plutonium Finishing Plant, tank waste evaporators, and 
plutonium conccntration facilities as well as slightly contaminatcd or c l ck  structurcs such as ’ 
storage facilitics, change rooms, sampling stations, warchouscs, shops, and officcs. Many of 
thcse structures are no longer in use and are awaiting final disposition, while others are still in 
opcration. Central Plateau closure planning includes final disposition of structures currently in 
survcillance and maintenance and final disposition of currently active structurcs following 
dcactivation. Sevcntccn Ccntral Platcau structures wcre demolished in fiscal year 2005. 
Planning is undcrway to procccd with additional structure rcmoval pending disposition dccisions. 
m- Nearly 2000 wells have bccn drilled on the Ccntral Plateau for groundwater and vadose 
zone monitoring or sampling; thcse will no Iongcr be rcquircd after closurc activitics. Central 
Plateau closure planning includes integrated well dccommissioning to cnsure that pathways to 
the groundwatcr are scaled to rcduce the potential for contaminant migration to the groundwater. 
Closure Process Steps 
To standardize planning, a sCrics of closure process stcps were idcntificd that cover the full m g e  
of activitics rcquircd to complete rcmcdiation of the Ccntnl Platcau. These steps, shown in 
Figure 2, form the basis for scope, schedule, and cost tcmplatcs applied to each item within cach 
closure elcment. An integratcd rcsource-loadcd schedule was dcvclopcd accounting for cach of 
the 4,000 significant itcms rcquiring closure as well as common or crosscutting clcrncnts, such 
as projcct management, infrastructure rcmoval and rclocation, ctc. Logical conncctions and 
prcdcccssor/succcssor relationships bctwccn proccss stcps and closure clcmentditems wcre 
defincd. This resulted in a rcalistic rcprcscntation of the full scope of closure actions and a 
mechanism to more clearly communicate the magnitude of the effort associated with Ccntral 
Platcau closurc. 
PATH FORWARD 
The integrated schcdule highlightcd potcntial risks associatcd with implcmcntation of Central 
Ptatcau closure planning and arcas whcre opportunitics iue available for substantial improvcment 
in cost, schedule, or resource utilization. The primary prognmmatic risks to meeting the Central 
Plateau closure cost and schcdule goals wcre idcntificd as: ( I )  final disposition dccisions 
diffcring significantly from those assumcd in the schcdulc; (2) logistical complexities associatcd 
with large-scale movcmcnt of materials for void fill and banier construction; (3) delays causcd 
by rcstrictions on movcmcnt of materials intended for disposition offsite, e.g. stabilizcd 
plutonium, spcnt nuclear fuels, and vitrificd tank wastcs; and (4) availability of funding due to 
compcting site and national priorities. 
While risks rclatcd to offsite shipment restrictions and funding availability ;uc generally beyond 
the control of Centnl Plateau closure planning, risks associated with disposition decisions and 
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logistical issues can be mitigated by near term actions. Since the Plan was completed in 
September 2004, DOE and Fluor have taken action in those areas. 
I 
Fig. 2 Closure process steps aided development of an integrated resource-loaded schedule. 
Disposition Decisions 
Most Central Plateau closure actions are authorized and documented using the following key 
regulations: 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) [6]; or 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) [7]. as amended with review as applicable under 
(CERCLA) [5]; 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) [SI. 
The H d o r d  Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) [9] defines 
an overarching action plan for compliance with RCRA and CERCLA requirements. The 
fundamental principles guiding the development of decision strategies are to ensure that the 
disposition approaches protect public and worker health and the environment, provide for 
stakeholder involvement, achieve risk reduction without unwarranted delay, and increase the 
levels of regulatory agency involvement as the level of hazard and stakeholder interest increases. 
The strategy for achieving disposition decisions in accordance with the Tri-Party Agreement for 
three of the five closure elements has been the focus of recent actions. 
Facilitv Binning - For the canyon facilities and other structures still requiring disposition 
decisions, the Tri-Party Agreement agencies - DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the State of Washington Department of Ecology (Ecology) - chartered a team of 
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agcncy and contractor staffto define the proccss for disposition of all Ccntrat Platcau facilities 
and gain agreement on the path forward for reaching disposition decisions. This activity, known 
as facility binning, categorizes structures in “bins” to optimize resources applied to reaching 
disposition decisions, identifics a specific regulatory path for each facility bin, and provides a 
mechanism to gain Tri-Party Agrccment agency concurrence on the path foward and the extent 
of agency involvement. 
Disposition decisions for most Central Plateau facilities contaminated with radioactive materials 
or othcr hazardous substanccs will be madqusing the CERCLA process in accordancqwith the 
joint DOE-EPA Poky on Decommissioning DOE Facilities Under CERCLA [lo]. In most 
structures whcre the presence of radionuclidcs and othcr CERCLA hazardous substances poses a 
substantial threat of release and a response action is necessary to protect human health and the 
cnvironmcnt, a non-time critical removal action is deemed to be an appropriate response action 
undcr the Joint Policy. Some complex structures, such as canyon facilities, wilt use the more 
comprchensive CERCLA remcdial action process instead. Where no threat of release exists, 
disposition decisions will be made using NEPA pmcsscs for evaluation of fcderal actions. 
Some Central Plateau facilities contain RCRA trcatmcnt, storage, and disposal units. ln some 
cases, closure of the RCRA unit will accomplish complete disposition of the structure. In other 
cases, closure ofa  RCRA unit within a structure will be intcgrated with CERCLA processes for 
disposition of the rcmaindcr of the structure. 
Waste Site Dccision Stratcgy- Prior to the development of the Plan, waste site decision 
documents had bccn procceding down a path that utilized process-based operable units (OUs) to 
group rcmcdiation dccisions by the source of the waste being discharged to the site. The 
resuIting alternative evaluation documents proved to be inadcquate to allow for comprehensive 
dccisions on rcmcdial actions for some Ob. The potential for delays and rework associated 
with thcse dccisions reprcsentcd substantial programmatic risk to achieving timely Ccntrrtl 
Platcau closure. The Tri-Party Agreement agencies are utilizing a collaborative effort to evaluate 
issues and concerns within the decision-making process. 
This effort refocuses future remcdial investigation (RI) activities using decision model groups for 
those sitcs not suitable to the OU grouping to take advantage of lessons learned in previous RI 
activitics. The model group conccpt considers the physical similarities of the waste sites more 
than the source of the waste discharged to the site. This will rcsult in waste site modcl ’proups 
that have like chanctcristics, are likely to utilize similarmcthods for characterization and 
invcstigation, and would be expectcd IO respond similarly in alternative evaluations. In the early 
stagcs of this collaborative effort, a DOWFluor team worked with rcprcscntativcs from EPA, 
Ecology, other site contractors, and the State of Oregon to reach agrement on (1) the description 
and critcria for discrete model groups and (2) the categorization of each waste site into the 
appropriate model group. Some model group sitcs that are expcctcd to have a straightforward 
decision may move on an accelcratcd path through the fcasibility study and dccision-making 
process to cnable remcdiation work to continue while other, more complex, dccisions are being 
made. 
Risk Manamnent in the Decision-Makina Process - The Tri-Piuty Agreement agencics 
cstablishcd a risk framework to define key paramctcrs that strongly influcnce risk asscssment 
and, conscquently, decision-making. The agencies documcntcd the risk framework in a rcsponse 
to advice from the Hanford Advisory Board in 2002. [ 1 I] Application and impternentation of 
risk framework paramctcrs has rcsultcd in sevcral issues that must be addressed to enable 
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dccisions to be made on the more complex Central Platcau waste sitcs. DOE and Fluor are 
managing risk associated with the decision panmctcrs by exploring and investigating 
opportunities to validate assumptions being used in the decision process. Critical panmctcrs and 
associatcd issucs are idcntificd in the following sections. 
Land iise - Potcntial future land uscs define the appropriate exposure scenarios to be uscd in 
risk analysis. DOE has the responsibility for land use planning for the Hanford Site and 
documcntcd the rcsults of an interactive planning proccss in the IianJorrd Comprehensive 
Land Use Plan. Environmentallinpact Statement [ I2 J and ,Record of Dccision. [ 133 The 
Ccntral Plateau is currcntly assumcd to be used for industrial-exclusive purposcs, meaning 
any uscs would be compatible with the currcnt DOE mission of cnvironmcntal restoration 
and waste management. Under this assumption, risk analyscs can take credit for restrictions 
associatcd with that use, such as controls on acccss, excavation, surface disturbances, 
vegetation, drilling, and groundwatcr use. The issue impacting currcnt decision-m&hg 
relatcs to how long industrial use will be maintained. It is gencrally accepted by the ‘ 
regulatory agcncics and stakcholdcrs that industrial-cxclusive use is appropriate for the 
cxpcctcd operating pcriod (approximately 50 ycars) and that the land can be rcstrictcd for 
othcr industrial uscs for an additional 100 ycars. However, the concern over the viability of 
the active institutional controls ncccssary to enforce restrictions beyond 150 ycars raises 
questions about the appropriatcncss of using only industrial use-based exposure scenarios in 
risk analysis for dccision-making. Additionally, as rcstrictions in future land use dccrease, 
the tolctance for unccrtainty in sampling and charactcrization stratcgics also diminishes. 
Accordingly, invcstigation activities could become more complex, lengthy, and costly. 
Institrrtional controls - Institutional controls are dcfincd as non-cnginccred rcstrictions on 
activities, acccss, or exposure to land, groundwatcr, surface watcr, waste disposal mas, and 
contaminatcd mcdia. They can include proccdural acccss controls, fencing, wqning noticcs, 
and propcrty controls such as dccd rcstrictions. Institutional controls can be applicd at a 
waste site as p a  of or following implcmcntation of the selcctcd rcmcdy. The sclcction of 
institutional controls has not bccn standardized on the Hanford Site, so various projccts apply 
diffcrcnt institutional controls. Risk analysis and rcmcdy sclcction arc strongly inllucnccd by 
the type of control that is considcrcd viable. For example, fcdcnl control of the Ccntnl 
Plateau can be considered an institutional control by providing an affirmative means of 
ensuring acccss and use rcstrictions are enforced. Howevcr, the length of time assumcd for 
fcdcral control drivcs the point at which other exposure sccniuios, such as inadvcrtcnt 
intrusion, should be considered. 
Core zone- The Tri-Party Agrccmcnt agcncies dcsignatcd a ’’core zone” for industrial- 
exclusive use for the purpose of risk asscssment as part of the risk framework parameters. 
The exact nature of the core zone and trcatmcnt of waste sitcs inside the core zone and near 
the boundarics is currcntly at issue. Designation of the core zone did not address the 
question of whcthcr the size of the core zone should shrink over time nor did it consider 
whcthcr waste sitcs near the core zone boundary should be evaluatcd diffcrcntly bccause of 
potcntial impact on human health and the cnvironmcnt outside the boundary. Additionally, 
rcsolution of the core zone question must also consider the appropriate decision unit for 
making the most effective and beneficial dccisions (e.g. individual waste sites, opcrable 
units, model groups, or geographic arcas.) 
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Points of compliance - The size and configuration of he  dccision unit dircctly influences the 
points at which compliance with clcanup standards is measured. Bccause groundwater is 
typically 75-90 mctcrs (250-300 fcct) below ground surface on the Central Platcau, the extent 
of soil rcmcdiation rcquircd is highly dcpcndcnt on whcre the point of compliance for the 
groundwater rcmcdiation goal is measured. Currently, CERCLA risk analysis for the 
Hanford Site assumes that the point of compliance is the intcrscction of the groundwater and 
a vcrtical line drawn at the cdge of the waste site. This docs not take into account other 
contamination sourccs in the arca, lateral spreading that may occur as contaminants move 
through the vadose zone, or mixing that will occur when contaminants anive at the saturatcd 
zone. The decision strategy nccds to evaluate waste site remcdiation as part of an integntcd 
systcm and apply the point of compliance that is appropriate for the gcognphic situation, 
including considcration of the rclationship with other contaminant plumes in the arca. 
Postdated inadvertent intnrsion - Intrudcr sccnarios arc evaluated to asscss the 
protcctivcncss of rcmcdics in the event of loss of institutional controls. Because the Central 
Platcau is cxpcctcd to be undcr long-tcrm fcdcral control, the probability of inadvcrtcnt 
intrusion into contaminatcd mcdia is low. Howcvcr, the Tri-Party Agrccmcnt agcncics 
agrccd to considcr impacts to a postulatcd inadvertent intruder as part of the risk framework 
paramctcrs. Risk assessments conductcd for various projects on the Hanford Site use 
differing mcthods and assumptions for calculating risk to the inadvcrtcnt intrudcr. 
Actions - Collaborative efforts are continuing to furthcr define key decision paramctcrs and 
to rcsolve the uncertainties affccting disposition dccisions. DOE and Fluor are actively 
cngaging the rcgulatory agcncics and stakcholdcrs to close the open items that have a 
significant influence on risk analysis and, therefore, investigation and rcmcdy sclcction, 
including: 
0 Should risk analysis for waste sites near the core zone boundary considcr potcntial 
What are the fundamcntal charactcristics of institutional controls, such as: 
‘ 
cxposurc scenarios consistcnt with land uses outside the boundary? 
- What constitutes a control, e.g. fcdcral ownership, posted warning noticcs, physical 
bruTicr (e.g. fcnccs), decd rcstrictions, ctc? 
- What time frame is appropriate to distinguish bctwccn active control, whcrc 
inadvertent intrusion is not considcred credible, and passive control, whcre 
intrusion should be considcrcd? 
controls can be devclopcd for such an m a ?  
Is a buffcr zone needed around the core zone and if so, what appropriate institutional 
What is an appropriate dccision unit? 
0 What points of compliance should be uscd to establish rcmcdiation goals that arc 
0 What is thc appropriate role of intrudcr risk in thc dccision-making proccss? 
What are charactcristics of intrudcr sccnarios to be cvaluatcd, such as: 
protcctive of groundwatcr while accounting for other activitics on the Central Plateau? 
- What standard intruder scenarios should be evaluatcd (well driller, trcnchcr, rural 
rcsidcnt, ctc.)? 
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- What input parameters should be uscd to calculate contaminants available to the 
- What time fnmcs (e.g. post-I50 years) should be assumed for intrusion? 
intrudcr (well diamctcr, depth or trench, size of garden, ctc.)? 
Part of the dccision strategy for the Ccntral Platcau is to move forward with rcmcdiation in 
sclcctcd areas to test the key assumptions and evaluate the cffcctivcncss of potcntial solutions. 
This is most evident in the actions being takcn by DOE and Fluor to procccd with the prototype 
U Plant zone closure. 
Prototwe Imolcmcntation in the U Plant Zone - The U Plant zone, locatcd in the southwest 
portion of the Ccntral Platcau, is inactive and ready for clcanup, rcmcdiation decisions have 
alrcady bccn made or are n&ng complction, and the zone contains a representative cross- 
scction of closure elcmcnts and typcs of clcanup actions expectcd to be rcquircd in othcr zones. 
One CERCLA Record of Dccision, for the U Plant Canyon, was rcccived in Octobcr 2005 [4] 
and a second, for the 200-UW-1 Operable Unit covcring U Plant waste sitcs, is expcctcd to be 
complctcd in early 2006 The sclcctcd rcmcdy for the U Plant Canyon will rcsult in the 
trcatmcnt and cncapsulation of wastcs within the groutcd, rcinforccd-concrcte structure of the 
canyon. The structure will then be covcrcd by a protcctive cngincercd barricr. The U Plant 
waste sitcs include 31 sitcs that rcquire a remcdial rcsponsc. The cxpcctcd rcmcdy is a 
combination of no action; removal, katmcnt, and disposal; monitored natural attcnuation; and 
containmcnt with an cnginccrcd surface b m k .  The specific rcmcdy for cach site is dcpcndcnt 
on the nature and cxtcnt of the contamination and the characteristics of the waste site. The Tri- 
Party Agrccmcnt agencies have agrccd to procccd with issuance of the Records of Dceision to 
movc ahcad with U Plant mne rcmcdiation. The key dccision parmctcrs have bccn ddrcsscd 
as dcscribcd below in the U Plant Canyon ROD [4] and in discussions among the Ti-Party 
Agrcemcnt agencies for the U Plant Waste Sites ROD. DOE and the regulatory agencies will 
evaluate the appropriatcncss and effcctivcncss of thcse decisions ancr implcmcntation, rcsulting 
in lcssons lcamed to be applicd to the rcmainder of Ccntral Platcau rcmcdiation activities. 
Land use - The rcasonably anticipated future land use for the U Plant Zone is continucd 
Industrial Exclusive activitics for at least 50 years, followcd by industrial use (e.g. non DOE 
workcr) for the foresecable future. Land and groundwater USC will be rcstrictcd to industrial 
uscs indefinitely bccause the rcsidual contamination remaining aftcr rcmcdiation is not . 
expected to allow unrestricted use. DOE is responsible for maintaining land use controls, 
evcn if procedural responsibility for these activitics is transfcrrcd to another party. 
lnsrirrtrionnl controls - Institutional controls include access controls, recording of residual 
contamination in dccd notices, maintcnance of surface banicrs, and rcstrictions or 
prohibitions on irrigation, well drilling, groundwater use, intrusive work, and any activitics 
that would disrupt the surface barriers or monitoring systems. Adequate control of the site 
and knowledge of the hazards is assumcd to continue for at Icast 150 years. After that 
period, there is a highcr probability that institutional control could lapse and the risk of a 
postulated indvertcnt intrudcr incrcascs. 
Core zone - The U Plant Canyon and U Plant mnc waste sitcs are inside the core zone and 
more than GOO meters (ZOO0 fcet) from the conccptual core zone boundary. Thcrefore, 
rcmcdiation dccisions did not considcr the proximity of a potential non-industrial use arc& 
The dccision units sclcctcd for thc U Plant zone are bascd on individual clcmcnts, such as the 
U Plant canyon building and individual waste sites. 
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Poinr ofcontnfiance- For the U Plant Canyon, the point of compliance for groundwater 
protection will be established during the remedial dcsign phase to coordinate the engincercd 
surface brvrier design with groundwater monitoring requirements for U Plant zone waste 
sites and groundwatcr remediation projects. Developmcnt of the groundwater monitoring 
network for the U Plant zone waste sites will consider evaluation points for cleanup standards 
described in the Feasibility Study [I41 and will be documented in an Operations and 
Maintenance Plan to be developed. 
Postitfated inudverrent infrtrsfon -The postulatcd inadvertent intrusion model assumes the 
loss of institutional controls and resulting exposure to the inadvcrtcnt intruders that may be 
able to frcely access the site. For the U Plant Canyon, impacts to the postulated inadvertent 
intruder were assumed to be bounded by a residential exposure scenario. Residents are 
assumed to live and raise and consume crops and livestock on or adjacent to the rcmcdiated 
structure. The intruder also drinks groundwater, irrigates crops and waters livestock from an 
adjacent well. Cleanup at the U Plant Canyon is based on the assumption that the selected 
rcmcdy eflcctivcly isolates contaminants and scvcring exposure pathways. As a result, thcrc 
are no unacceptable risks for the postulated inadvcrtcnt intruder from the U Plant Canyon. 
For the U Plant zone waste sites, the potential risks to the postulatcd inadvertent intruder 
wcre evaluated for a construction trench worker, a well driller, and a rural resident. The 
combination of remedies for the 31 waste sites provides the best balance of tradcoffs among 
the alternatives for each of the sites. The goal of the remedies is to limit exposure by 
severing exposure pathways wherever possible. This provides ovmll protection of human 
health and the cnvironmcnt, including postulatcd inadvertent intruders. 
In the spirit of moving forward to gain valuable implementation expericnce, DOE has agrccd to 
the exploratory solutions to the dccision strategy issucs that are specific to the U Plant zone only 
at this time. DOE and Fluor will continue to evaluate these solutions while working with the, 
regulatory agcncics to formulate a final dccision strategy. 
Logistical Issues 
The significant logistical issue identified in the Plan for Central Plateau Closure involved the 
procurcmcnt, transport, and staging of the large volume of materials necessary to implement 
selcctcd remedies. This includes soil, grout or othcr materials to be used for void filling below 
ground structures and waste sites, either to stabilize the site and prevcnt subsidcncc or to restore 
the surface after significant volumes of waste have been removed for treatment and disposal 
elsewhere. This will also include soils, gravel, sand, or other materials brought in to construct 
enginccrcd banicrs where that rcmcdy is selected. Remedies at the U Plant Zone include both 
significant void fill and barrier construction. Lessons-learned during the near t m  remediation 
activities at the U Plant Zone will aid DOE and Fluor in addrcssing logistical issues and applying 
these lessons lcarncd to othcr Central Platcau closure actions. Additional information on U Plant 
Zone activities is contained in UPfunt Geographic Area Closure Protol);oe [IS]. 
I 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The approach documented in the Plan for Central Plateau Closure defines the full scope of work 
rcquircd and quantifies the resources necessary to complete Central Plateau dosure, Since initial 
devclopmcnt of the Plan, DOE and Fluor have begun to realize the benefits of the overall 
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intcgratcd approach. The Plan organizcd Ccntral Platcau cleanup using Lhrce key concepts - 
ctosure zones, closure elements, and closure process steps. These concepts cnablcd a systematic 
approach to closure planning not previously used for the Central Platcau. Twcnty-two closure 
zones were identificd, organizcd around significant processing or waste managcmcnt facilities. 
Five closure elements - canyons, tanks, waste sites, structures and wells - were formulatcd to 
sort itcms requiring clcanup into logical groupings to enable consistcnt closure approachcs, 
schedules, and cost cstimation. Standard cIosure process steps were idcntificd that covcr the full 
range of activitics rcquircd to complcte remcdiation of the Ccntnl Plateau. This cnablcd Fluor to 
dcvclop a rcalistic rcprcscntation of the full scope of closure actions and to more clearly ' 
communicate the magnitude of the effort associatcd with Ccntral Plateau's closure. 
The integratcd schcdule highlighted potential risks associated with implementation of Central 
Platcau closure planning. Key risk arcas associated with disposition dccisions and logistical 
issucs iuc bcing addrcsscd by near term actions. The facility binning proccss is il collaborative 
effort among the Tri-Party Agrccmcnt agcncics to gain consensus on the path forward for 
disposition of rcmaining Ccntral Plateau structures and clcar the way for timely proccssing of 
facility disposition dccisions. A similar process for waste sites is undcrway to evaluate issues 
and conccms within the waste site decision-making proccss. The Tri-Party Agrccmcnt 
agcncics' support for a reviscd path forward will result in improvcd dccision-making for waste 
sites. DOE and Fluor are moving forward wilh he prototype U Plant zone closure activities to 
dcmonstrate and refine mcthods for rcmcdiation on the Ccntral Plateau and achieve risk 
rcduction while mitigating programmatic risks. 
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